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COMMENTARY
DUE PROCESS AND FEDERAL GRANT
TERMINATION: SOME OBSERVATIONS
EDGAR S. CAHN*
Professor Catz's article, Due Process and Federal Grant Termination:
Challenging Agency Discretion Through a Reasons Requirement,' pro-
vides an invaluable summary of the lines of grant termination case law
and at the same time argues persuasively that provision of a quasi-ad-
judicative pretermination hearing is necessary and desirable to protect
the rights and interests articulated in that case law.
Yet, even as the article's very publication indicates that grant law has
begun to come of age, other events pose the question of whether we are
witnessing the dawn or the twilight of this area of the law. The follow-
ing constitutes at best a partial listing of those developments.
(1) Discretionary grants themselves are being radically reduced in
number and are a prime target for budget cutting under the present
administration.
(2) Grants that were previously awarded on an individual, discre-
tionary basis are being combined into consolidated block grants to
states, where the allocation and award of discrete portions will be the
product of each state's political process and where internal governmen-
tal structure award decisions will be less susceptible to review or chal-
lenge than the quasi-adjudicative determinations involved in grant
determinations.
(3) The entities receiving grants are less and less the kind of non-
profit, grass roots corporations that feature so prominently in some of
the cases discussed by Professor Catz. Rather, state agencies and de-
partments are becoming more and more the vehicle for distribution of
federal funds to further public policies. These agencies are shielded
from scrutiny by a virtually irrebutable presumption of competence
and by a judicial deference to federalism that will make courts less hos-
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pitable fora for those who seek to challenge the capacity, integrity, or
capability of state agencies.
(4) Massive use by the Office of Management and Budget of the
process of deferral of expenditures keeps all grantees-public and pri-
vate-in a state of uncertainty regarding the ultimate amount or uses of
a grant award. This strategy is tantamount to impoundment, yet it
complies sufficiently with the procedural and notice requirements of
the Impoundment Control Act of 1964 as to make assembly of the facts
necessary to mount a challenge virtually impossible.
(5) Termination of grants increasingly partakes of quasi-legislative
determinations about the merits of entire programs and strategies. As a
result, grant termination is far less susceptible of assessment in terms of
the kinds of standards and procedures that Professor Catz properly ob-
serves have the greatest, if not exclusive, applicability when individual
grantees are affected.
(6) Tax credits and incentives are now being cited as a vehicle for
addressing social problems by creating incentives for the private sector
to address many of those problems that grant programs had previously
sought to alleviate.
(7) Reorganization of the federal government, involving transfers
of programs, reductions in force, increases in the number of political
appointees, and use of reforms in civil service enacted to enhance bu-
reaucratic accountability, combined with budget cuts, attrition, layoffs,
and furloughs, has created an atmosphere of uncertainty and instability
that makes it difficult to obtain information or determine who the deci-
sion maker is or the process by which a decision was made.
Several larger propositions emerge from the foregoing. First, as a
general proposition, the meeting of any rule or norm depends upon the
institutional environment of that rule of law. The definition of "grant
law" or "regulatory law' thus necessarily must be expanded to include
at least two additional areas of law: the law governing the budgetary
process and the law governing civil service personnel. Thus, for in-
stance, the most recent attempt to save some of the remaining War on
Poverty programs housed in the Community Services Administration,
National Council of CSA Locals v. Schweiker,2 took the form of an ac-
tion by federal employees to ensure that they, as advocates of those
programs with a unique composite institutional memory, had a prefer-
2. 526 F. Supp. 861 (D.D.C. 1981).
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ential right of transfer when those programs were transferred to the
Department of Health and Human Services. In that case the employ-
ees were successful in invoking a little known provision of the Veterans
Preference Act of 1944, which extended preferential consideration pre-
viously limited to veterans to all present incumbents of competitive
civil service positions. The court enjoined a layoff of all employees,
stating:
Congress has not exempted the transfer of anti-poverty programs from
the Community Services Administration to the Department of Health and
Human Services, see Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981, from
the coverage of the Veterans Preference Act of 1944, as amended, 5
U.S.C. § 3503. This being the case the defendants must select any em-
ployees pursuant to the preference accorded under the Veterans Prefer-
ence Act of 1944.3
Second, the proliferation of grant programs should be understood in
context as an attempt by society to permit and foster piecemeal renego-
tiation of the terms of the social contract between and among different
groups with a view toward enhancing egalitarian objectives. It is no
accident that contract law as applied to federal contractors and to pri-
vate parties was extended by analogy to provide protection for a new
class of persons deemed eligible for the first time to enter into the body
politic. In effect, we have been observing the rise, and now the possible
demise, of an attempt to alter status relationships by a shift from status
to contract and back again to status of a new and more equal nature.
Grant law is part of that attempt. Affirmative action efforts represent
another and closely related aspect. A shift away from grants is in fact a
shift away from efforts to alter status relationships. It remains to be
seen whether the shifts in status that did take place as a result of the
utilization of contract law (not only with respect to federal grants but
also in the area of landlord tenant law, employment law, and consumer
law) were on a scale sufficient to effect permanent change and lay the
basis for continuing renegotiation of the social contract with new par-
ties to that social compact who can, over time, assert their more equal
status.
Third, the grant law described seeks to protect not only the grantee,
but also the intended beneficiary of the grant. In this sense, the concept
of "trust" and the use of trust law is highly significant. Just as the par-
ties affected become the beneficiaries of a trust (rather than merely
3. National Council of CSA Locals v. Schweicker, 526 F. Supp. 861, 866 (D.D.C. 1981).
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third-party beneficiaries to a contract), so too the judge becomes a
chancellor sitting in equity rather than ajudge in a court of law. This is
why we witnessed the emergence of what Abram Chayes described so
insightfully as a new "public law" model of litigation. In such cases,
entire executive branch agencies were put into a kind of judicial receiv-
ership in which the remedy fashioned underwent constant change to
meet constantly changing circumstances in order to surmount new and
unforeseen obstacles and evasionary tactics. It would be inappropriate
simply to dismiss such a development as judicial activism. The phe-
nomenon is an essential reaction to the rate of change that became an
accepted and even cliche fact of life with the publication of Toffier's
Future Shock and The Third Wave. Regardless of the fate of grant law
per se, it is clear that dispute resolution institutions, capable of shaping
new, flexible, and effective remedies, have become increasingly essen-
tial. The model of judicial behavior posited in Chayes' seminal piece is
part of a larger phenomenon by which society seeks to create new prob-
lem-solving institutions that look less and less to the past and rely far
less on concepts of fault as the touchstone for determining remedy. In
this respect, the new Bankruptcy Code, with the greater protection it
affords consumers and the range of powers it affords the trustee in
bankruptcy, may be of equal or greater importance (symbolically and
pragmatically) to the extent that responsibility for social problems has
genuinely shifted to a private sector that is itself in fragile condition.
Finally, it should be noted that whatever gains have been secured for
the poor and disenfranchised, the procedural protections and doctrines
described in this important article by Professor Catz partake of a much
older tradition-the tradition by which the rule of law circumscribes
the capacity of the sovereign to act capriciously and even despotically.
The prospects for democracy and for individual liberty may be grim.
The rate of change tends to concentrate power and resources in the
executive branch, simply as a matter of national survival.
Our Constitution sought to check executive branch despotism by a
separation of powers and by a federal system. National panic over in-
flation, unemployment, a negative balance of trade, or a decline in in-
ternational prestige and power cannot, however, save the people from
themselves. The first victims are likely to be the poor, the disen-
franchised, the most recently enfranchised, and the defenders of un-
popular causes. It is in this context that one must regard Professor
Catz' piece as part of that great tradition that so far has protected us
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from the return of the Star Chamber, the days of McCarthy, or the
more recent peril of Watergate. His final emphasis on the substantive
importance of procedure may far outweigh the possibly ephemeral fate
of grant law. This is the true nobility of the piece, one that evokes
echoes of the exchange between Sir Thomas More and Roper inA Man
for All Seasons:
More: What would you do? Cut a great road through the law to get after
the Devil?
Roper: I'd cut down every law in England to do that!
And Moore replies:
Oh? And when the law was down, and the Devil turned round on you-
where would you hide, Roper, the laws all being flat? This country's
planted thick with laws from coast to coast-Man's laws not God's---and
if you cut them down-and you're just the man to do it-d'you really
think you could stand upright in the winds that would blow then? Yes,
I'd give the Devil benefit of law for my own safety's sake.
There is more at stake, quite literally, in the Catz article than the
future of grant law.
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